This study analyses the impact of Bolsa Família (a brazilian conditional cash transfer programme) in the occupational choice of workers regarding formal and informal activities. The methodology relies on a discontinuity in the programme eligibility rule regarding children's age to attain the identification of a LATE parameter. Our results suggest that the cash transfer does not affect the occupational choice of Brazilian adults neither among formal and informal jobs nor the allocation of hours across sectors.
INTRODUCTION

Bolsa Família Program (henceforth known as BFP) is a conditional cash transfer (CCT)
which aims to improve the welfare of poor families. There are programmes with similar characteristics to BFP in several developing countries, both inside and outside Latin America. In some countries such as Brazil, the programme coverage is quite extensive.
For example, in 2013, BFP had already benefited more than 13 million households. In this context, some concerns are raised regarding possible deleterious effects of this CCT on the labour supply of adults. 1 The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of CCT programmes like BFP in the allocation of labour supply among the formal and informal sectors. In particular, the goal is to analyse to what extent BFP distorts the occupational choice of beneficiaries in the sense of making them more likely either to opt for an informal job or to allocate more hours to informal activities.
The idea that income from informal employment is less visible to the programme managing institution than that from formal employment is the motive behind this * The authors thank Sergei Soares for several explanations on the inner-workings of Bolsa Familia. We benefited from valuable comments from our colleagues Pedro Herculano de Souza, Miguel Foguel and Fabio Soares. We also benefited from comments of the participants in the 40º Meeting of ANPEC, the 2013 edition of Itaú International Seminar of Economic Evaluation, and a seminar at the Economic Department of PUC-Rio University. Finally, we are grateful to Italo Cabral de Souza for the assistance in processing the 2006 PNAD. ** Researcher at Ipea. Email: ana.barbosa@ipea.gov.br. *** Researcher at Ipea. Email: carlos.corseuil@ipea.gov.br. 1 In this regard, see Chapter 4 of Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a review of the effects of CCT programs on the labour supply.
investigation. Thus, it is possible that beneficiaries can migrate from an occupation in the formal sector to an occupation in the informal sector of the economy or simply have a higher likelihood of moving from unemployment/inactivity to an informal occupation.
This effect would be deleterious to society, for at least two reasons. First, a change in the composition of employment, which reduces the share of the formal sector, compromises the state's ability to fund its policies, including those directly related to social welfare. A second reason for concern relating to a supposed effect in favour of the informal employment refers to a lower probability of BFP beneficiaries leaving poverty while employed in the informal sector.
Brazil can be considered an excellent country for analysis, given the availability in a household survey with national coverage (PNAD) of accurate information both about the formality status of the jobs (formal or informal) and on the status of the household vis-à-vis both eligibility and participation in BFP (beneficiary or non-beneficiary).
There is, however, a major challenge in researching the effects of BFP upon the adult labour supply. Participation in this type of programme is voluntary. Therefore, the group of beneficiaries may differ in certain aspects affecting both participation and the choice of occupation, in comparison to the group of non-beneficiaries. This makes it difficult to find a comparison group that resembles the treatment group.
Our strategy for identifying the effect of BFP on occupational choice seeks to isolate the real effect of the programme from differences to the unobservable characteristics of individuals. As a source of identification, we used a discontinuity in the BFP eligibility rule, which is to limit the age of the children at the beginning of the school year (which, in Brazil, coincides with the calendar year). This type of strategy is known as Regression Discontinuity Design -RDD 2 . In particular, since eligibility does not coincide with participation in the programme, the explored methodology uses the case known as a fuzzy RD. Our main identification hypothesis is to assume that the unobservable characteristics of adults in families whose youngest child reaches the age threshold for eligibility shortly before the beginning of the school year are very similar to those of families whose youngest child reaches the eligibility age threshold shortly after the beginning of the school year. This is considered a weak assumption, given the randomness component involved in determining the exact date of birth of an individual.
In addition, we carried out tests whose results are consistent with the validity of this hypothesis.
Empirical evidence of the impact of CCT programmes on the occupational choices of adult programme beneficiaries is still incipient. What we do have are studies estimating the impact on the labour supply of individuals in a disaggregated manner for occupation type (Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) ; Ribas and Soares (2011) and Brauw et al. (2012) ).
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These three papers use some version of the difference-in-differences estimator. The identification hypothesis in these works, therefore, is that the unobservable characteristics of either individuals or group of individuals that influence the selection of the programme are fixed in time.
The result found by Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) for Mexico indicates an effect on the participation of self-employed individuals immediately after the implementation of the programme. However, this effect disappears shortly thereafter. Regarding the results of the work on BFP, it identifies a decrease in the participation in the formal sector [Ribas and Soares (2011) ] as well as an increase in working hours within the informal sector [Brauw et al. (2012) ].
Our results do not support the hypothesis that the BFP could stimulate the informality among beneficiaries. It is worth mentioning that this result is robust for distinct dimensions of informality: namely jobs and hours. Moreover jobs were considered in two alternative ways. First we consider only the main job of the household head. The other alternative is to consider the second most important job of the household adults (either the secondary job of the household head or the main job of his/her partner).
This paper is organized into four sections, besides this introduction and a final section devoted to concluding remarks. The next section presents the BFP rules, including eligibility criteria and benefit amounts. The third section describes the econometric procedures adopted for the evaluation of BFP's impact on the composition of the labour market. The database and the construction of our sample are presented in the fifth section, which also provides some descriptive statistics. The main econometric results are presented in the sixth section.
BFP ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Programme eligibility depends on two main criteria. The first is associated with socioeconomic status as measured by per capita household income (PCHI)-the sum of the gross income earned by all family members divided by the total number of individuals in the household. The second criterion is linked to family composition, in particular to the age of the youngest child. BFP also requires the recipient to comply with conditionalities associated with child health and education 5 .
In September 2006, two household groups were considered eligible. The first group was composed of households with monthly PCHI between R$ 50.01 and R$ 100.00
(below the poverty line at the time) provided they had pregnant women, nursing mothers, children and adolescents aged 0 to 15 years old. This group received a variable benefit, depending on the number of members in the situations listed above, reaching the limit of R$ 45.00. The other group consists of families in extreme poverty, whose PCHI was less than or equal to R$ 50.00 monthly. Such families would receive a basic benefit of R$ 50.00, regardless of their composition, and a variable benefit if there were dependents among family members 6 . The maximum amount of BFP benefits that an extremely poor family could receive was R$ 95.00.
Despite several studies that seek to reap the benefits of BFP exploring the condition of eligibility based on the PCHI, in this paper we chose to explore the eligibility condition based on the age of the youngest child. As we will see later our methodology depends, therefore, on individuals not being able to manipulate the value of the variable of the eligibility criteria chosen. Given the existence of a birth certificate in Brazil, it seems more reasonable to assume that there is no way to manipulate the age of the children than it is to assume that there is no way to manipulate the PCHI. This argument is an immediate consequence of the fact that the income of an informal occupation can be hidden from those responsible for running BFP, unlike what happens with the income derived from formal occupations 7 .
It is important to note how household selection takes place within the programme. In the next section, it will become evident that, the process of excluding households that become ineligible is more important than the process of adding new households to its rank of beneficiaries. In particular, the process of excluding households that become ineligible according to the criterion of the age of the youngest child is central to our analysis. According to BFP bylaws, exclusion does not occur immediately following the 16th birthday of the youngest child, but rather after the end of his/her school year.
8 All the information regarding the management of BFP are from Soares and Sátyro (2009 
METHODOLOGY
The identification problem and its consequences for estimation
The identification of the effect of BFP on occupational choice is not a trivial task, given that there is room for self-selection of individuals in the programme. This problem arises when the probability of an individual entering the programme depends on unobservable characteristics that may also influence their occupational choice.
The previous section provides evidence that there is room for this kind of problem, in the case of BFP. Basically, the probability of selection will be greater for an eligible household that is better capable of becoming visible to the eyes of the municipal agents.
For a better view of the problems arising from self-selection based on unobservable characteristics, consider the following regression model relating the occupational choice of the head of household "i" (Y i ) to the age of the youngest child on the last day of the previous year (I i ), as well as participation in BFP (T i ):
where c is a normalization constant representing the age limit of the youngest child to the eligibility of the household (in our case, 16 years, exactly, on December 31, 2005), X denotes any controls to be inserted in the model. Our parameter of interest is λ 1 , which represents the effect of program participation on occupational choice.
The fact that there is self-selection in BFP, based on unobservable characteristics, leads to the following property of this model:
Consequently, λ 1 cannot be identified by comparing the occupational choices of those who participated (T=1) and those who did not participate (T=0), even when keeping the other explanatory variables of the model (X) constant. This is because, according to (8), when T is varying ε is also varying. Therefore, we will not be able to separate the effect on Y arising from the variation of T from that arising from the variation in ε. In terms of estimation, this means that λ 1 cannot be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares.
In this case, the ideal scenario is to have some source of variation in T among individuals that does not affect ε. Put another way, it would be interesting to have a variable at hand that affects the decision of individuals to participate in the program and which is not related to unobservable characteristics of individuals. This variable serves as an instrument for the correct identification of our parameter of interest, because we do not want to know the impact of this variable, but its variation is used to shift participation, while keeping everything else constant 11 .
Generally, we resort to an exogenous eligibility criterion as the instrument for the correct identification of the treatment. This exogenous criterion may be due to a random draw or a discontinuity in the rule of eligibility. In the latter case, we have what is conventionally called a fuzzy regression discontinuity 12 in literature.
As discussed in the previous section, there is a discontinuity in BFP's eligibility rule, which prompts us to choose the fuzzy regression discontinuity approach. The clearly shows that participation in the programme drops sharply around the mark corresponding to the threshold for one of the eligibility criteria. Reasonably assuming that everything else should be very similar between these two household groups (including the values of ε), the age of the youngest child around 16 years is the exogenous variation that shifts T, keeping everything else constant, and, therefore, allows us to identify the effect of Bolsa Família.
Graph 1: Share of Households that Receive the BFP benefit
Source: 2006 PNAD.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss identification in a more precise fashion. A number of contributions have been made to guide researchers on the assumptions required to identify the effect of a programme in this context, as well as some operational procedures for its estimation. Our intent is to follow the recommendations of this recent literature, which can be accessed in the papers by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) , among other sources.
The solution via discontinuity
The identification and, consequently, the consistent estimation of parameter λ1 in equation (7) require some additional assumptions. For didactic purposes, we assume, at first, that Bolsa Família uniformly affects the occupational choice of individuals (a context that is often denoted in literature as 'homogeneous effects'). In this context, the following properties for households where young children are in an age around c are sufficient to identify our parameter of interest: of households differ with respect to the probability of selection into the programme. It is expected that the group with the youngest child who has not yet turned 16 will have a higher probability of selection.
We have postponed a more detailed discussion on the validity of these hypotheses to the next section. For now, we assume that both are valid and move on to the presentation of our identification strategy. From equation (7), it is easy to see that identification comes from the following ratio:
eligibility works as an instrument for participation. In intuitive terms, it explores the contrast between individuals with ages that are very close to the eligibility threshold.
The variation in eligibility for these individuals induces an exogenous variation in BFP participation which, in turn, induces a causal effect on the probability of being employed in the formal sector.
For operational purposes, we will use a sample restricted to households with a youngest child aged around "c", given the unique role of these households in the identification of the parameter of interest. In this sample, we apply the two-stage least squares estimator, where the first stage may be represented by the following equation:
where D i indicates whether the household is eligible through the age criterion, i.e.:
To put it in another way, in our strategy, D i serves as an instrument for T i. Another important issue from the operational perspective is what should be considered "near the age limit for eligibility". For this definition, we follow the procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) , noting that such a procedure is proposed for the case of sharp discontinuity. In the case of fuzzy discontinuity, as in our estimation, there is a procedure designed to identify the optimal size of the window, but it is known that this size must be a little larger than that indicated for the sharp case.
Heterogeneous effects and interpretation of the identified parameter
In the literature on impact assessment, it is common to relax the hypothesis of homogeneous effect, allowing the benefits of the programme in question to vary between individuals. Thus, equation (7) shall present λ 1i as opposed to λ 1 . Nothing changes for the matter of identification and estimation procedures described previously.
However, there is a significant change in the interpretation of the parameter identified by the right-hand side of the equation (11) Besides the changed interpretation, the environment with a heterogeneous effect also requires two additional identification hypotheses 14 . The first, known as "monotonicity", requires that there be no household that decides to participate in the program when it is not eligible and decides not to participate when it is eligible (what literature calls "defier" behaviour). That is, besides the compliers, we admit the existence of only two other types of households for whom participation is not guided by eligibility: the one that always participate regardless of being eligible or not ("always taker") and the one that never participate regardless of being eligible or not ("never taker").
The second additional hypothesis is more abstract and it is known as independence.
In our context, this hypothesis states that the potential outcomes of participation and occupational choice conditioned to each of the possible eligibility statuses (eligible or not) is independent of the eligibility status actually observed for the household. For example, an eligible household which actually participates in the programme would have an unobserved participation result if it were not eligible. The hypothesis in question requires that these two potential outcomes of participation, when it is eligible and when it is not, be independent of whether the household is eligible or not. The same goes for potential occupational choices associated to the condition of being eligible or not.
It is important to note that these two additional hypotheses are not testable, unlike the first two cases described in section 3.2, which will be considered again in the next section. 13 There is a discussion in the literature about how interesting is the identification of a valid parameter for such a restricted group (see Heckman [1997] ). However, in our case, it can be argued that it is of interest to identify this group in view of the change in the eligibility criteria that occurred in July 2008, which now considers eligible households with young children up to 17 years. 14 The work of Imbens and Angrist (1994) , which coined the term LATE, presents a more technical discussion about the identification of this parameter. The book by Angrist and Pischke (2009) provides a more intuitive approach to the same topic.
Data and descriptive statistics
As seen in the previous section, the implementation of our identification strategy Regarding the definition of informality, we work with the one used in most studies on informality with Brazilian data, which distinguishes employees by having an employment registration signed by the employer and allocates all employers to the formal sector and the self-employed to the informal.
At this point of the analysis, the definition of our sample is subject to two constraints.
The first restriction was imposed by our methodology, which makes exclusive use of observations around the threshold that defines eligibility. In our context, this means restricting the sample to households with the youngest child at around 16 years of age.
The second filter refers to workers with problematic occupational insertions 16 . Further on we will comment on additional restrictions.
Graph 2 shows the percentage of household heads employed in September 2006
whose occupation is informal, as a function of the gap in months (measured on 15 The question is: "In September 2006, did a resident of this household receive money from the social program Bolsa Familia?" Followed these possible answers: 1) Yes; 2) No. 16 We classified as employed during the reference week individuals who executed any paid work during it, or the ones who executed an unpaid work in that week for at least fifteen hours, or who have paid jobs of which they are temporarily away. It is not considered here as occupied individuals who executed any work for their own consumption or construction during the reference week. It is noted that employment in the informal sector is quite similar between the two groups being compared. That is, among occupied household heads, the share working in the informal sector does not seem to vary with the household's eligibility to BFP. It is worth noting that the eligible group showed a significantly greater participation in BFP than the ineligible group. Therefore, it is noted that eligibility influences participation which, in turn, does not seem to influence informality. This result will be confirmed in our estimates with the instrumental variable method, adapted to the context of fuzzy regression discontinuity. Before going to the results, however, we shall report some evidence that shows that the method is, indeed, adequate for our purposes. 
Testing identification hypotheses
In summary, the identification of our parameter of interest relies on four hypotheses: i) condition of local exclusion (around c), represented by (9); ii) validity of the instrument (also around c), represented by (10); iii) monotonicity; and iv) independence. Ideally, we would like to be able to test the validity of all of them. However, the last two are not testable hypotheses. Therefore, the provision of evidence about the validity relies on the first two.
Validity of the Instrument
The hypothesis of the validity of the instrument is easily tested, since it consists in comparing the conditional means of observed variables, as expressed in equation (10).
The coefficient λ 2 in the equation (12) captures exactly the difference between the two sides of equation (10). Therefore, testing the significance of this coefficient is one way of testing the hypothesis of the instrument's validity.
Note that we are including in this sample a group with a high probability of behaving like an "always taker", composed of households with PCHIs less than or equal to R$ 50.00. As stated earlier, this group is eligible regardless of the household's age composition. Thus, the propensity to participate in the programme for this group of households may not vary with the age of the youngest child.
On the other hand, households with high PCHIs tend to behave like "never takers", since the probability of being registered tends to be very low, regardless of the age of the youngest child. In fact, the percentage of beneficiaries is 0.7 per cent when we analyse households with PCHIs over R$ 700.00 17 .
These groups may hinder the identification of λ 1 since, as discussed in section 3, the source of identification in our empirical strategy is the group of "compliers". Therefore, the smaller the share of "compliers" or greater the participation of "always takers" and "never-takers", the lower the power of our identification strategy. In particular, a decrease in the share of "compliers" tends to invalidate our second identification hypothesis, represented by (10).
we did not add any filters relative to what was mentioned in the previous section (filter I). In the second sample, we excluded households with PCHIs over R$ 700.00 (filter II).
In the third sample, we excluded households with PCHIs lower than R$ 50.00 and over R$ 700.00 (filter III). Table 1 above reports the estimates for λ 2 in three pairs of columns corresponding to the three samples. In each pair of columns we report the coefficients estimates and their standard errors in the first column; the second statistic is in brackets below the first one.
The results in Table 1 indicate that of the 12 specifications being considered (4 windows x 3 filters), only one coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. In all other specifications, the estimates are positive and significantly different from zero, a result which supports the hypothesis that the eligibility criteria based on the age of the youngest child positively affects the propensity to participate in the program, for households where the age of the youngest Filter I Households with PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Filter II Households with PCHIs > R$ 50.00 and PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Total Sample
All households receiving the PBF propensity to benefit from BFP drops significantly when the household does not meet the eligibility criteria for BFP's variable benefit.
In the second column of each pair of columns we report the window size used. As mentioned earlier, there is no indicated procedure to determine the optimal size of the window in the case of fuzzy discontinuity. Thus, we consider alternative sizes, given that the optimal size for the window, in the case of fuzzy discontinuity, should be slightly higher than that recommended in the case of acute discontinuity. The four different window sizes considered originate the four lines of results. In the first line we consider the size recommended by the procedure for acute discontinuity. In the other lines we consider larger windows: 10 per cent larger in the second line, 25 per cent larger in the third line and 50 per cent larger in the fourth line. The indicated window sizes were around two months.
Condition of exclusion
The condition of exclusion around c is not so easy to test, since it involves the behaviour of a variable that has not been observed. This hypothesis requires the continuity of the unobservable variable around c. There are two common procedures in the literature to provide indirect evidence about the validity of this hypothesis. In the first procedure, there is a search for evidence of continuity in the control variables (x). It is expected that a sharp discontinuity in the observed variables should also be sharp in the case of unobserved variables. Table 2 presents a comparison of certain observable characteristics of the household head and of the family as a whole, recorded in the 2006 PNAD among households where the age of the youngest child is slightly less and slightly more than 16 on 31/12/2005. To define the groups marked as eligible and ineligible, we used a radius of two months, as in the previous item. We also followed the tables in the previous section regarding the delineation of three distinct samples, according to the use of per capita household income for this purpose. In general, we can say that the numbers in a group never stray too far from the respective comparison group. For some variables such as age of the head of household and the number of people in the household, the proximity between groups is striking in any of the three samples considered. Even in the case of other variables, the values tend not to differ significantly between the eligible and ineligible groups. The biggest changes are recorded for variable geographical location and household income. Even the difference in this last variable is limited to the first sample only.
In the second procedure, to provide evidence regarding the validity of the condition of exclusion, the evidence is derived from the expected consequences on the behaviour of variables observed in a scenario where this assumption is no longer valid.
In our context, we can think of two types of scenarios where the condition of exclusion ceases to be valid: i) if the household manipulates information about the age As such, the discontinuity in the definition of eligibility based on the age of the youngest child will be explored in this article as being exogenous. 18 The estimate was achieved through the Kernel method with Epanechnikov weighting. 19 It can be argued that there is more interest, on the part of the households, to manipulate such information in front of a programme agent than in front of an IBGE interviewer. However, since the 2006 PNAD collected information on BFP and IBGE is a government agency, it is possible that a household prone to manipulating information in front of programme agents showed the same likelihood to do so in front of an IBGE interviewer. 20 Hypothetically, there would be yet another kind of attitude that could compromise the exogenous character that we attribute to the criterion based on the age of the youngest child, which is changing the age at which children leave home. In particular, it would be a problem for our analysis if the children left home below the age limit for eligibility in an environment without Bolsa Familia and had postponed this move as BFP beneficiary to maximize the period during which they receive the benefit. There is no information available to check this hypothesis. 
MAIN RESULTS
In this section we present three sets of results for the effect of BFP on informality.
The difference among these three sets relates to the different dimensions of informality we consider.
Tables 3 shows the main results of this work. These are the estimated values referring to effect of Bolsa Família on the probability of the main occupation held by the head of the household being informal, shown in equation (7) by coefficient λ 1 . The tables follow the same pattern as the previous one, with filters that define the sample varying across the columns and the considered window size for the age of the youngest child varying across the rows.
The point estimates of our parameters of interest are negative in all twelve situations, with results reported in the -30,9 -29,1 -27,3 -25,6 -23,8 -22,0 -20,3 -18,5 -16,8 -15,0 -13,2 -11,5 -9,7 -7,9 -6 ,2 -4,4 -2,6 -0,9 0,9 2,7 4,4 6,2 8,0 9,7 11,5 13, (table 3) . That is, we were unable to identify any effect of Bolsa Família in the propensity of household heads occupying informal jobs. We repeated the same exercise to estimate the effect of BFP on the probability of the secondary occupation of the household (which can be the secondary occupation of the household head or the main occupation of another household member) being informal.
The results reported in Table 4 go in the same direction as those estimated for the household heads. That is, although the point estimate is negative, the program has no impact on the secondary occupational choice of the household, between formal and informal jobs. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we sought to identify the extent to which Bolsa Família Program has changed either choices or hours of work towards informal jobs. Unlike what was found in the existing empirical literature, our results suggest that the programme has no impact on the occupational choice of beneficiaries nor in the allocation of hours, between formal and informal jobs.
It is worth mentioning that this result is solid in a wide range of situations that we have considered. Twelve separate household samples were used to estimate our parameter of interest. In addition, for each sample we estimate the effect of the programme both in the allocation of working hours and occupational choice, regarding both the main occupation of the household head and in the secondary occupation in the household. In all these situations, the estimate was statistically nil.
One of the major contributions of our article is the application of a method that allows us to deal with the problem of self-selection based on unobservable characteristics. We exploited a discontinuity present in the eligibility criteria of the programme, about the age of the youngest child. We assumed that the discontinuity 
